

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10405

22 March 1982

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 11/82)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

JPRS L/10405

22 March 1982

## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

(FOUO 11/82)

### CONTENTS

#### INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

- Arab Aid to Mauritania Outlined  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 29 Jan 82) ..... 1

#### IRAN

- Khomeyni Seen Influencing Islam Internationally  
(Jacques Buob; L'EXPRESS, 29 Jan-4 Feb 82) ..... 3

- Soviets Said To Be 'Aiming at Iran'  
(PARIS MATCH, 12 Feb 82) ..... 10

#### IRAQ

- Deputy Oil Minister's View on Iranian Bombing  
(Roger Matthews; THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 5 Mar 82) ..... 13

#### JORDAN

- 'THE OBSERVER' Interviews King Husayn  
(Husayn Interview; THE OBSERVER, 28 Feb 82) ..... 15

#### MAURITANIA

- Increase in French Aid Planned for 1982  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 29 Jan 82) ..... 18

#### SYRIA

- Discussion on Interview With President Hafiz al-Asad  
(Patrick Seale; THE OBSERVER, 7 Mar 82) ..... 19

- a -

[III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ARAB AID TO MAURITANIA OUTLINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1890, 29 Jan 82 p 256

[Text] The Arab Organization for Industrial Development (OADI), together with UNIDO and the Mauritanian Government, has organized the first solidarity meeting in order to cooperate with the industrial development of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, held in Nouakchott from 18 to 20 January 1982. The purpose of the meeting was to find means enabling countries and Arab development Institutions participating in it to cooperate so as to promote industrial development in Mauritania. The meeting examined in detail all proposed projects and modes of bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the framework of Arab economic cooperation.

Seven countries attended: Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya and Mauritania, along with six Arab development institutions: the Arab Investment Guarantee Company, the Arab Industrial Development Fund, the Arab Organization for Industrial Development, the Arab Libyan Foreign Investment Company, the Saudi Development Fund and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). Finally, two international organizations were also present: UNIDO and the UNDP.

The chairman of the meeting introduced the projects proposed in order to promote industrial, economic and social development in Mauritania: 1) establishment of a phosphate fertilizer plant; 2) date processing and packing plant; 3) establishment of a foundry in Nouakchott; 4) an agroindustrial sugar complex in Boghe; 5) a sugar refinery in Nouakchott; modernization of the Nouakchott slaughterhouse; 7) a handicraft village in Nouakchott; 8) establishment of a tannery in Nouakchott; 9) a brickworks in Boghe; 10) proposed restructuring of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce; 11) establishment of a National Professional Training Center in Nouakchott; 12) an electric powerplant in Nouakchott; 13) a livestock feed production plant in Nouakchott; 14) proposed construction, repair and maintenance of boats (naval repair yard) at Nouadhibou; 15) development of cottage fishing; 16) establishment of a dairy at Rosso; 17) establishment of a livestock vaccine manufacturing plant; and 18) purchase of a Boeing 737.

Mauritania's representative gave a brief report on the nature of the projects and the objectives of the economic and social development plans, which can be summed

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

up as follows: optimum utilization of natural resources; substitution of national products for main products now imported; development of handicrafts and the establishment of small and medium-size industrial units; and the completion of certain major projects, such as the sugar and oil refineries.

Discussions and deliberations took place within the four committees. Most of the delegations manifested great interest in the projects submitted to them and promised to finance either the feasibility study or to contribute to their financing directly.

Finally, the meeting recommended that the OADI, UNIDO and the UNDP grant financial and technical aid to the projects requiring additional financial resources, to the maximum extent they are able to do so.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982

11,464

CSO: 4519/119

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

KHOMAYNI SEEN INFLUENCING ISLAM INTERNATIONALLY

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 29 Jan-4 Feb 82 pp 74-77

[Article by Jacques Buob]

[Text] "The world," said Abdelkrim, "is dominated by two imperialisms: capitalism and communism. Why in the world should we submit to those systems? We have Islam. Islam is our culture and our roots. It is also a political philosophy. Why should we give up something that once made us powerful?"

We were walking on the campus with our hands in our pockets because the winter sun is cool in Tunisia. Abdelkrim is a liberal arts student. He wears jeans and a windbreaker. Also a beard, but it is a shaggy beard, not like the well-trimmed ones adorning the faces of those known here as the Moslem Brothers. Abdelkrim is more of an anarchist.

"Of course," I answered, "but if you are taking the Iranian regime as a model for development, the situation doesn't look very encouraging."

"Don't go so fast. Khomeyni can be criticized. But his arrival on the scene proved that Islam could take power--that Western ideologies are not inevitable. He defeated the United States! Do you realize that? What a shock in people's minds!"

What is certain in any case is that since Khomeyni, the movement generally known as Moslem fundamentalism has won millions of followers. And the cry "God is great," chanted by muezzins from the tops of minarets, is no longer simply the call to prayer that European tourists see as "local color." It has become a revolutionary call.

It is to the cry of "God is great" that the Afghan mujahedin attack Moscow's tanks, that Anwar al-Sadat's assassins fire on the rais, that Syria's Moslem Brothers explode deadly bombs, that Algerian fundamentalists clash with the police, and that "fanatics" occupy the mosque in Mecca.

All the regimes--progressive or conservative, Marxist or dictatorial--now fear fundamentalist outbursts. This includes--especially--Saudi Arabia, keeper of the holy places, even though it is the guardian of orthodoxy.

In the space of a few years, the sociopolitical climate in the Islamic world has changed spectacularly. One can sense it just by wandering around the streets.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In Algiers, for example. In educated Algeria, which has been pressed into the austere mold of Houari Boumediene's progressive Third Worldism. Ever since independence, the influence of the omnipresent National Liberation Front (FLN) and its mass organizations has far exceeded that of the mosques. For that matter, the only ones who preached in them were old fogeys whose sermons were censored in advance.

In Algiers on Fridays, the sidewalks and streets are full of the faithful. The imams speak. And they are no longer afraid to denounce government policy and the corruption of men or morals. The universities are restless. In the streets, one can no longer count the number of girls wearing the "hijeb"--the scarf covering their hair--and the voluminous robe concealing their shape. It is the uniform of the Islam of reconquest.

This is the second generation of independence. The FLN, colonization, and the war of national liberation? This generation knows nothing about it, and what is more, it is not the least interested.

"You fought the war and won independence? What independence? All you think about is cars, refrigerators, and Western comfort. You don't even speak Arabic. All you think about is France--the West and its turpitude. You still expect salvation to come from there. You have denied your culture, and you are not even independent!"

That is how one young man talks to his father, who was a mujahed and shed his blood. In the universities, the fundamentalists have set up places of prayer that may be transformed into political rostrums--an easy shift, since in Islam, whatever is religious is political and vice versa. In the summer, it happens that women at the beach are set upon, and gangs break into private parties on the pretext that cassettes by an "obscene" singer are being played. A woman judge (according to the Koran, a woman cannot dispense justice) is the target of vitriol in the street. Knives for fighting have been found on university premises. And last September, there were bloody incidents at the Laghouat oasis, where police had to use force to evict a group of armed fundamentalists who had taken over a mosque and ejected its official imam.

"Playing With a Live Grenade"

But President Chadli Bendjedid has attempted to win the believers over. He played on the fundamentalist theme to eliminate the last supporters of Boumediene and the pro-Marxists surrounding Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui. He has made the pilgrimage to Mecca twice. He has lifted the censorship of Friday sermons. He has allowed certain prominent people close to the fundamentalists to enter the government, where they hold such important portfolios as religious affairs, justice, and interior. The 5-year plan calls for the construction of 160 mosques, an equal number of Koranic schools, 3 institutes of Islamic science, 26 centers of Islamic culture, and 2 national--and, naturally, Islamic--academies. The Arabization of education, often anarchic, is finally taking big steps forward.

Will all those concessions to God's side be enough to shield the regime from a fundamentalist outburst? It is not so certain.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

For the moment, the Algerian fundamentalist movement lacks a leader. Ahmed Ben Bella, released after long years in prison and converted to Islamic theses close to Khomeyni's, might be the man. His wife already wears the hijeb. In any case, he has understood the enormous political strength represented by the new faithful in the mosques.

"Chadli has tried to use their support to establish his power, which is still fragile. He has encouraged their progress. But he is playing with a live grenade. Someday it may very well blow up in his hands."

Omar poured us another swig of scotch. Below the building on the sidewalks of Didouche-Mourad Street, there was the crush of people that one sees every evening in Algiers--all those innumerable Travoltas who still dream of big cars, girls, and money. Meanwhile, the fundamentalists are becoming structured in the lycees, universities, factories, and government offices (especially in the sectors of information and culture). They are opening judo clubs where they learn to fight. The authorities have ordered them closed. Meanwhile, private individuals bring in some famous mufti at their own expense to preach in private on the glories of Islam.

"How about you, Omar? You like the bottle and you live it up. In those people's eyes, you are totally decadent."

"Yes, and totally French-speaking, too--in language and culture. Instinctively. If they ever come to power, I will be considered one of the real 'depraved of the earth.' So anyway, how about another scotch?"

What are the reasons for this return to sources by the young people? They are the same everywhere. A generation crisis and a mystical crisis, and also a search, in the face of imported and maladapted ideologies, for an authenticity which colonization killed and which decolonization has not been able to revive. There is also a crisis with the regimes in power.

Those postcolonial regimes are dictatorships, harsh or mild, and as single-party regimes or something very close to it, they have stifled all discontent. As a result, the only place left for free expression has been the mosques, where God's screen allows everything. One can let fly at President Habib Bourguiba, that agitator who drinks orange juice in public during Ramadan. Or at al-Sadat, who allowed his wife Jihane to be kissed by the abhorred American, Jimmy Carter, in front of all the world's television cameras.

The lawyer for Lieutenant Istambouly, al-Sadat's assassin, exclaimed: "They are not assassins! They are angels from heaven!" Behind their zoo grating, the 24 conspirators, who are all said to be members of the Tekfir Wal Hijra (Excommunication and Hegira) group, yell and shriek with laughter as they wave their pocket Korans. No, they are not guilty, because the divine word justifies the murder of tyrants who do not follow the precepts of the prophet. All they have done is apply God's word. They have killed the corrupt man who made a pact with Israel, abandoned his people to poverty, and imprisoned good Moslems. Glory to them! They are certain of dying. Glory to them! They will go to paradise.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"Gave the Moslems' Hearts Back to Them"

Egypt is the cradle of the authentic Moslem Brothers. The brotherhood sprang up here in Dhu al Qi'da 1347 of the Hegira--that is, in May 1929. It was founded by a school teacher named Hassan el-Banna.

"When I heard his voice for the first time, I dreaded the moment when he would finish his speech. In 100 minutes, he took the hearts of the Moslems into the palms of his hands and stirred them as he willed. When he stopped talking, he gave the Moslems' hearts back to them, but not mine, which remained in his hands."

Those words, spoken by one of Hassan el-Banna's first disciples, are reported by Gilles Keppel, a French university student who is currently completing a thesis on the Moslem Brotherhood. They could just as well as have come from the lips of those who not so long ago used to invade an entire neighborhood in Cairo around a poor mosque to hear the bewitching voice of a blind imam. Friday after Friday, Sheikh Kichk would justify in advance the fall of al-Sadat's regime. Hassan el-Banna died on 12 February 1949 at the hands of Gamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's secret police. Kichk is in prison--silenced by al-Sadat, who realized too late that Kichk's monotonous chant carried a fatal message for him. But Kichk's voice still speaks to millions of Moslems beyond the borders of the state of Greater Islam. His voice, recorded on innumerable cassettes whose extraordinary proselytizing power was first recognized by Khomeyni, continues to preach in the deserts and cities on behalf of a strictly Islamic society in which the Sharia--Moslem law--will be the foundation for everything.

Diploma-Carrying Assassins

Hosni Moubarek, Egypt's new rais, is taking a moderate approach and freeing some of the Moslem Brothers interned by al-Sadat, among them the brotherhood's emir, Sheikh Telmesani. But the old emir has long been considered a moderate in terms of the fanaticism displayed by the small groups springing up in Egypt and throughout the Moslem world. To a certain extent, those "extremists" are to the Moslem Brothers what the Baader Gang was to Alain Krivine's Communist League.

The members of those groups are not poor illiterates who have been swayed by reactionary theses. No. Al-Sadat's assassins are university graduates who have known modern schools and studied "Western" subjects. Incidentally, the famous Islamic Al-Azhar University in Cairo is not the refuge of the fundamentalists. They prefer the schools of science and medicine.

As they do elsewhere. Listen to this 24-year-old Tunisian woman. She teaches French. She wears the hijeb. She is engaged. Her future husband does not want her to work, and she agrees.

"A woman's chief mission is to insure her husband's peace, tranquillity, and happiness and to take care of his household. There are colleagues who can always replace me as a teacher, but not as a wife and mother."

We asked her: "Do you feel that there is a biological difference between men and women?"

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"Yes. A woman's role, first of all, is to bear children. But also to propagate a good understanding of Islam: the spark needs only a breath to break into flame. It must be revived to save this people. Have not the faith and its influence been at the root of Islamic civilization, which transformed a nomadic people into a conquering people?" There passes a picture of the Iranian Guardians of the Revolution, men in combat uniform and women in chador, defending Islam's gains with Kalashnikovs by their sides.

Now to London. In a comfortable hotel room at the Swiss Cottage, Dr Said Ramadan serves tea and small cakes that a Pakistani brother has brought to him from over there. Imprisoned and exiled by Nasir and married to Hassan el-Banna's daughter, he is considered one of the Moslem Brotherhood's most brilliant thinkers.

"Well, Doctor, what do you think of al-Sadat's assassins? Were they right to kill the dictator?"

Ramadan hesitated.

"First of all, you should understand that the group's name--Tekfir Wal Hijra--is a pure invention on the government's part. That in itself shows how information can be invented. Those poor guys acted with their heart and their faith. But who can tell us that the entire affair was not manipulated from the start?"

There was another moment of silence, and then he added: "The situation is very complex."

In mid-December, a highly secret meeting of all the Islamic parties throughout the world was held right here in London. It was attended by representatives of the Philippine groups engaged in a bloody guerrilla war against the regime of President Ferdinand Marcos, as well as by Afghans, Syrians, Tunisians, Egyptians, and Saudis. Iran and Libya sent observers. From Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella himself kept up with the progress of the "summit meeting" by telephone.

During that strange meeting, there was considerable discussion of relations between the Islamic movements and the Soviet Union. We had already discussed that question with Abdelkrim on the campus in Tunis. He had said: "Listen, we cannot look at things the same way you do. The enemy here in our regions is capitalism. The colonizers--the ones who rubbed our noses in the mud--were not the Soviets. They are not the ones supporting Israel and humiliating the Arabs. Of course, the Soviets are atheists. We don't trust them. But they are not hereditary enemies. Not yet."

At the London meeting, the talk was more or less along the same lines. Except from the Afghan representatives, obviously.

What was that secret meeting? The embryo of an Islamic terrorist international?

Said Ramadan said: "Do you want me to answer frankly? Well! At the beginning, we did not know exactly why we were meeting. And when it was over, we still didn't know why we had met."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

He repeated: "The situation is very complex." And indeed it is for the (authentic) Moslem Brothers, who, while they have retained definite moral authority and have considerable financial resources, are being increasingly left behind by small groups which, like the European terrorists (the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] or the Red Brigades, for example) are subject to manipulation because of their very fanaticism.

There is no taboo against terrorism in the name of God, and (progressive) Algeria and Egypt are not exempt from it. Neither is secular Tunisia, which has imprisoned 90 fundamentalist leaders and thinks it has found the answer in reestablishing a multiparty system that does not exclude the Communist Party. Neither is Morocco and its extremely wealthy king. In Morocco the phenomenon is latent but already perceptible. Neither is Syria and its regime with its links to Moscow. In Syria a real religious war is underway between the Moslem Brothers, who are being savagely repressed but who continue to reappear, and the minority Alawite sect to which the government belongs. Neither is Iraq, where the Ba'thists are on the defensive. And neither is Saudi Arabia, whose degenerate princes "spend millions of dollars in the casinos" and are the "playthings of U.S. policy in the region." Those regimes are all targets for fundamentalists seeking an ideal Islamic society that remains to be invented.

In an attempt to simplify things, we can identify four major sources of inspiration and financing for the Moslem fundamentalist movements.

1. Iran: Imam Khomeyni has never concealed his desire to see the revolution exported in the name of the Islamic world's recovered pride. Incidentally, his attitude is in total agreement with the Koran.
2. Libya: Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi has never made a mystery of his sympathies for all destabilizing groups, especially those which, lacking his "Little Green Book," brandish the Koran.
3. The Moslem Brothers: They have now chosen to take power by democratic means and condemn unjustified violence. But their organization, dating back a long way and well accustomed to operating underground, as well as their pan-Islamic ideology and moral authority, make them a basic element in Islam's fight.
4. And lastly, there is Saudi Arabia, which finances many movements, notably those that might open a breach in the "progressive" regimes. In Syria, for example, where it sends the Moslem Brothers aid by way of Jordan, and in Afghanistan, where it supports the extremist fundamentalist group known as Hezb-i-Islami.

As Ramadan says, the matter is complex when one realizes that while Qadhdhafi may well be playing the KGB's game, Saudi Arabia may well be playing that of the CIA.

"Mr Ramadan, in the case of the takeover of the mosque in Mecca, is it not true that you naturally support those who seized the Kaaba and denounced the corrupt power of the rulers in Riyadh?"

"Some very good people were involved in that. But there were also agitators. All of it, incidentally--as was true of the attempted coup d'etat in Bahrain (see

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

L'EXPRESS No 1591)--served only to bring about a buildup of Saudi Arabia's army and police. Whom does the crime benefit? In the final analysis, the Americans."

"He's Crazy, But He Pays"

Unless, of course, the Soviets are behind all that. Who is to know? Very complex, Mr Ramadan. All the more since out of all the manipulation and countermanipulation, one thing is certain. Everyone has something to gain from playing with the formidable desert wind that is sweeping the Moslem world. It is a very real wind.

Abdelkrim had said: "After all, in all of this, Khomeyni was the only one to elude all the traps set by the superpowers. He threw them all out."

"Yes, but at what cost? What about Qadhdhafi?"

"Qadhdhafi? He's crazy. But he pays. He was almost successful in January 1980, when he threw his commandos against Gafsa. But he is not really reliable. Of course, Khomeyni is going a bit far. But perhaps that is the price we must pay to get out of the capitalist-communist pincers."

The sun was going down, and it was cool. Abdelkrim got on the bus that would take him downtown.

"Well, goodbye. See you soon," we said.

"Inch Allah!"

COPYRIGHT: 1982 s.a. Groupe Express

11798

CSO: 4619/51

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

SOVIETS SAID TO BE 'AIMING AT IRAN'

Pairs PARIS MATCH in French 12 Feb 82 pp 70, 72

[Text] In Iran, the war is in full swing on all fronts. Against Iraq, the Army is waging slow and deadly trench warfare. Deprived of most of its monarchist generals and short of spare parts, it is all the less capable of wresting a semblance of victory because revolts are breaking out everywhere in the interior. Kurds, Turkomans and Baluchis are openly rejecting the Tehran regime. In Tehran too, a real battle is being fought in the corridors. The fact is that everyone is preparing for the post-Khomeini era. And the Tudeh party, communist and pro-Soviet, is tirelessly infiltrating the Islamic state. In effect, the Soviet Union is preparing to take possession of the old ayatollah's heritage. Bivouacking on the northern border, it is awaiting the favorable opportunity.

An exceptional occurrence: no executions are planned for next Thursday in Iran. The turbaned fanatics who surround Khomeini are getting ready to celebrate the third anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic Republic. But behind the public show planned for 11 February, an underground battle is in full swing in preparation for the post-Khomeini era. The equilibrium of an entire region of the world depends on the outcome of this struggle: either Iran will fall into the Soviet orbit, or else this country will restore friendly ties with the West. The essential element of the situation is that the popular support for the regime of the mullahs is in the process of crumbling, which was entirely foreseeable. Anyone who knew Iran in the 1960's and at the beginning of the 1970's can testify that this country was at the opposite pole from religious fanaticism. It was in reaction to the frantic modernism imposed by the shah that the mosques became the center of resistance. An abrupt return to the traditions of the Shi'ite sect was the only way of asserting its differentness and of rejecting an American-style culture--that is, a culture imported from outside. But in 3 years, the Islamic Republic has betrayed its ideal. Ignorant and intolerant mullahs have monopolized all powers, and today the hope is no longer what it was. Enthusiasm is now limited to the lowest strata of the population, the ones that always applaud when gallows are raised.

It has to be said that with regard to executions, the machinery is running at full steam. Opponents of the regime and representatives of ethnic or religious minorities are being shot pell-mell every day. Those called smugglers and those accused of immoral conduct--drug addicts, pederasts and adulterous women--are executed also. The local newspapers report these events with the greatest care, and it seems that one can have confidence in the macabre statistics they present: during hot

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

spells, there may be up to 100 executions per day; in the cooler periods, the figure may drop to 10. The manner of killing is left to the initiative of the local committees, who generally find rifles most expeditious. Reliable sources state that out of every 100 executions, there are at least 10 hangings. As for the traditional stonings, they are rare, and sometimes an entire week passes without stones flying and breaking heads. Meanwhile, the war with Iraq continues--a small-scale war resembling an endless boxing match between two punchy boxers. This conflict is exhausting the little that remains of the Iranian economy. Oil is flowing in dribbles. The factories are working in slow motion. Imports are limited to food products and a few rare spares for military materiel.

All this is sad, but it does not keep Iran from being a great country that today is in quest of its future. To simplify matters, one may say that there are two camps that are working behind the scenes. In one of the camps are the petite bourgeoisie, who are called the bazaar, and a certain number of officers seeking their Bonaparte. There are also tribes who, in the Iranian context, remain important: the Gashgai and the Boyer-Ahmadi of the Shiraz region, the Bakhtiari of the Ispahan region, the Kurds of the Kermanshah region, the Baluchis of the Pakistan-border region have had their fill of the terror imposed by Tehran and are opposed at any cost to the pro-Soviets' pulling the chestnuts out of the Islamic fire.

In the other camp, there is the communist party, which in Iran is called the Tudeh party and which is infiltrating with all its might, into the religious circles too. The current president, Ali Khamenei (not to be confused with Khomeini), as well as the president of the Supreme Court, Mr Ardabili, and the first vice president of the National Assembly, Mr Khoiniha, are considered religious personalities who sympathize with the Tudeh party. If, at the end of a long haul, the Tudeh succeeded in getting a sort of national union started, Iran would not take long in becoming a disguised satellite of the USSR. A number of cogwheels are already in position. First of all, experts from the Eastern countries appear whenever the surrounding disorder makes it necessary to call on outside help. Thus, Soviets are found in the steel industry and the secret police, Bulgarians in the petrochemical industry, and East Germans in antiaircraft defense. Secondly, the Tudeh party is strengthening its hold on the civil administration by taking all the deputy-minister and personnel-chief positions it can get. Thirdly, centralization of the economy is proceeding at a good clip, and trade relations with foreign countries are now in the hands of the state offices. Finally, the "Guardians of the Revolution" corps is growing stronger at the expense of the Army. The number of militiamen is to reach 70,000 by the end of 1982 and 120,000 by the end of 1983. There is even talk of creating an armored division whose mission would be domestic intimidation more than combat at the borders.

The most probable scenario is that the communists will not attempt anything while Khomeini is alive. Rather, they are making ready to take possession of the inheritance once the obstinate old man, already very weakened, has given up his soul to the God of the believers. If they achieve their ends, the face of the world will be changed. Nothing more or less than that. Iran has the material capacity to be the world's second-ranking exporter of oil. In particular, it occupies an unequalled strategic position on the Gulf that used to be called, and rightly so, the Persian Gulf. On the other side of this arm of the sea, within reach of a launch, lie Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Emirates.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

All this is so clear that the moment has come to pose a question. This question has nothing to do with human rights; rather, it is inspired by traditional power-relationships policy. Here it is: is it proper, from a strategic point of view, to get so upset about the fate of Poland, which before all these events was already part of the Soviet bloc, and to be so totally disinterested in Iran, which for its part is on the verge of toppling into either one camp or another? Isn't it an urgent matter to aid--secretly but strongly--those Iranians who would prefer to be our friends rather than the vassals of their very powerful neighbor who is bivouacking to the north of their border? In the current confrontation, to ask the question is to answer it.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 par Cogedipresse S.A.

11267  
CSO: 4619/55

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAQ

DEPUTY OIL MINISTER'S VIEW ON IRANIAN BOMBING

PM051307 London THE FINANCIAL TIMES in English 5 Mar 82 p 3

[Dispatch by Roger Matthews: "Iraq Admits Serious Bombing Damage to Oil Facilities"]

[Text] Baghdad--Iraq has suffered "serious and extensive" damage to its oil facilities during the war with Iran, now in its eighteenth month, which will cost billions of dollars to repair or replace Mr 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Samarra'i, deputy oil minister, said in an interview here yesterday.

His account was in sharp contrast to earlier Iraqi assessments which had tended to play down the amount of damage caused by Iranian bombing. Mr al-Samarra'i said, however, that Iraq's oil exports were running at about 900,000 barrels a day (b/d). The Syrian, Lebanese and Turkish terminals had an effective capacity of 1.1 m b/d.

The deputy minister said damage had been particularly severe in Kirkuk and Basra. A wide range of facilities had been bombed in Kirkuk, the main oil producing area, including degasification plants, processing plants and a pumping station. Refineries, especially in Basra, had been critically damaged.

Officials had not yet been able to carry out a detailed assessment, but Mr al-Samarra'i believed that several facilities were beyond repair. He was pessimistic about the prospects for the deep-water terminal at al-Faw which had been struck several times by the Iranians.

More ambitious repair work on facilities in the north may be able to start soon because of improvements in Iraq's air defence system. However, three Iranian aircraft which last week attempted the first air raid on Kirkuk since August 1981 were driven off. The lead aircraft was brought down by a surface-to-air missile and exploded in mid-air over Kirkuk golf course.

Iraq has received approval from Riyadh for the construction of a pipeline running across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. The pipeline will have a capacity of 40m to 50m tonnes a year, and a new terminal will be built to handle the crude on a site still to be decided.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Officials in Baghdad want to start detailed design work immediately, but the project is being delayed by difficulties in reaching agreement with Saudi Arabia over financing. Mr al-Samarra'i said the Saudis had not yet agreed to help with the finance.

Meanwhile, Iraq will continue to press Saudi Arabia for a change in its oil production policy. "We are in a good position to persuade our Saudi brothers of the negative effects of what they are doing," he said. Iraq was being forced to review its own pricing policy as a result of what was happening on international oil markets, which was short-sighted and self-defeating for the producers.

"Saudi Arabia is a sovereign country and has the right to produce oil at the level it wishes. but we must remind the Saudis as Arabs and members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that their policy cannot be in either their own short-term or long-term interests," Mr al-Samarra'i said.

COPYRIGHT: The Financial Times Ltd, 1982

CSO: 4400/156

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JORDAN

'THE OBSERVER' INTERVIEWS KING HUSAYN

PM011525 London THE OBSERVER in English 28 Feb 82 p 10

[Patrick Seale report of interview with Jordanian King Husayn; date and place not given: "Husayn Offers To Defend Gulf From Iranian Subversion"]

[Excerpts] Amman--In an exclusive and wide-ranging interview with THE OBSERVER, the King [Husayn] who in August celebrates 30 years of rule, declared that Jordan was ready to participate in the defence of the Gulf.

'We Arabs, alone, can help each other if there is trouble,' he said. 'At stake is not only our security but our identity. A super-power,' he added in a dismissive reference to American military moves in the area, 'can only intervene if another has already done so, and then it is too late.'

With the Iran-Iraq war still raging, and a dangerous Iran-backed shia underground beginning to show its hand as in last December's abortive coup in Bahrain, problems of security in Arabia loom large in the king's mind.

Last week Saudi Arabia concluded a security agreement with Oman, one of a network of such agreements it has been stitching together with its other fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council--Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and, before too long, Kuwait.

But the Jordanian view is that such arrangements between weak states would be more credible if underpinned by Jordanian military power.

In other words, Jordan is making a bid for 'associate' or 'honorary' membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council, offering its own rapid deployment force to douse any future revolutionary fires.

The commander-in-chief of Jordan's armed forces, Sharif Zayd Ibn Shakir, told me that paratroops in battalion, or if necessary brigade, strength could be airlifted at speed to any Gulf trouble-spot.

On a visit here two weeks ago, the United States Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger hinted the United States might consider selling Jordan F16 fighters and mobile Hawk ground-to-air missiles.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This announcement raised such a storm of Israeli protest that President Reagan, ducking for cover, declared that his defence secretary had brought him no such Jordanian requests.

Was that the way the King saw it? 'Although we didn't present specific requests to secretary Weinberger we did, of course, discuss our needs and requirements. What else does one talk about with a defence secretary?

'We do have a problem. We have a role in this area which we will not hesitate to play. Israel has access to the best in the American arsenal. Some other neighbours have access to the best in the Soviet arsenal. Meanwhile, our own capability is compromised.'

He added with great firmness: 'We have a legitimate right to seek new equipment and will pursue the matter and see what the responses are.

Last year, the King bought about 275 British Chieftain tanks with which to counter Syria's heavy Soviet-built T-72s. He will also shortly be taking delivery of advanced, mobile Soviet SAM-8s, effective against low-flying aircraft.

The King held out the prospect of further purchases from Britain, not only by Jordan alone but by 'a wider circle of Arab countries'--no doubt a reference to the possibility that Jordan, Iraq and some Gulf Cooperation Council members might buy the Tornado, built by the Anglo-German-Italian consortium, Panavia.

The King's active, even passionate, support for Iraq reflects his strategic vision of an Arab world gravely threatened by Khomeyni's Iran, in his view an expansionist, intractable and fanatically Shia power.

'This is not a war between Iraq and Iran alone. Iraq holds the front line of a conflict affecting the entire Gulf and much of the Arab world beyond it. Our entire future is at stake.

'An Iranian victory would make the Arabs of no consequence, it would set Shia against Sunni throughout the area with devastating effect. Fortunately, Iraq (which has a large Shia population) has not split under the strain and remains united as a nation.

'We have no alternative but to support Iraq to the utmost of our ability.'

The King's most biting criticism is directed against President al-Asad of Syria whom he accuses of breaking Arab ranks by joining Israel in support of the enemy in Tehran.

So, to shore up the Arabs against revolutionary Iran, the King would dearly like to break the Tehran-Damascus axis, and its extension to the Shia militias of Lebanon.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

There is little doubt that he would like to see a change of regime in Damascus. He described the recent fighting in Hamah as 'a popular uprising.'

But he categorically rejects Syria's charge that he gives help to its enemies. 'We have never interfered in the affairs of others nor do we tolerate their interference in our own.' Last week Jordan expelled the Syrian military attache and his staff.

On his other flank, the King watches with mounting frustration as Israel tightens its grip on the occupied West Bank across the Jordan.

For all its international reknown, the PLO has patently lost the battle on the ground. In despair, activists among the local Arab population are turning either to the Muslim brothers or back to the secular violence preached by the popular front leader George Babash. A few collaborators have rallied to the Israelis.

Moderates such as the King cannot give a lead so long as the United States turns a blind [eye] to Mr Begin's expansionism.

'What is American policy in relation to their very clear and explicit commitment?' the King asks in real anger.

'If America has torn up security council resolution 242, if it has given up the struggle to effect an Israeli withdrawal, it would be the biggest disaster imaginable.'

COPYRIGHT: The Observer Ltd 1982

CSO: 4400/156

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAURITANIA

INCREASE IN FRENCH AID PLANNED FOR 1982

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1890, 29 Jan 82 p 256

[Text] From 1981 to 1982, French aid to Mauritania will increase from 20 to 36 million French francs, according to an announcement made by French Minister of Cooperation Jean-Pierre Cot, who, along with Maj Ahmed Ould Minnith, Mauritanian minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, presided over the first meeting of the French-Mauritanian joint commission on cooperation held since the army's overthrow of President Ould Daddah's civilian regime in July 1978. The meeting took place from 21 to 23 January in Nouakchott.

Several Mauritanian projects will be financed by France, Cot added, particularly a proposed international communications earth station and a transit center in Nouakchott. These projects are the first phase of a plan to modernize communications infrastructures in which France intends to participate, he said.

Scientific and technical cooperation between France and Mauritania was also examined, particularly in the field of fishing, and a committee will meet in March to set up a research unit in the sector. In the meantime, the framework agreement is to be signed with the EEC. Cot said he had received assurances from Mauritanian authorities concerning the continuation of the activities of French fishermen in Mauritanian territorial waters.

Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, Mauritanian chief of state, met with Jean-Pierre Cot on 22 January. The latter said after the meeting that he had "noted agreement between France and Mauritania on almost all problems discussed, mainly the matter of the Western Sahara."

Cot also visited the Nouakchott Lycee, a technical institution financed by France.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982

11,464  
CSO: 4519/119

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SYRIA

DISCUSSION ON INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT HAFIZ AL-ASAD

LD070848 London THE OBSERVER in English 7 Mar 82 p 15

["Secure al-Asad Blames U.S. for the Bitter Battle of Hama" by Patrick Seale]

[Text] Fresh from the carnage of the Hama uprising--the great internal threat to him in almost 12 years of rule--President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria is a relaxed, confident, even jovial man.

For good reason: He has won. In an exclusive, 2-hour interview with THE OBSERVER last week, he said: 'Tell my enemies that my health is robust and my will is firm.'

Dr Henry Kissinger, in the latest volume of his memoirs, describes al-Asad as 'proud, tough, shrewd, cordial.' Apart from good health and determination, these are the qualities which have kept al-Asad at the top in Syria since November 1970--and near the top since 1963, when the Ba'th Party seized power. He is likely to stay in the saddle for some time.

Far from overthrowing al-Asad by sparking off a popular revolution, the Muslim brotherhood has suffered a grave defeat. Its stronghold has been flattened and hundreds--if not thousands--of its best fighters have been killed or captured. Like losers everywhere, it has forfeited public support.

Doubtless it is still capable of sporadic acts of terror, but the lesson of Hama is that the strategy of urban insurrection does not work in Syria. Only if a substantial part of the army, of his own 'Alawite community, turns against him will al-Asad be overthrown.

For the moment, he maintains control, firstly, by his grip on the Ba'th Party's military wing, the real center of power; secondly, through a countryside, well-oiled network of patronage, jobs, perks, handouts and favours; and thirdly by means of a powerful security and antiputsch apparatus.

The strength of his Muslim opponents lay in the real grievances of the population which they managed to mobilize: disgruntlement at widespread

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

profiteering by government agents; brutal repression of dissent by Rifaat al-Asad, the president's brother, who heads the regime's special forces; and the daily vexations of roadblocks and security checks.

The weakness of the Muslim brotherhood is that few Syrians would like to live under an ayatollah-style government. In the past 30 years Syria has been largely re-shaped on secular lines. The rising generation has known no other society than that of the Ba'th, which tomorrow celebrates 19 years of power in Syria.

In the fighting at Hama, the readiness to die of the Muslim brothers was met with an equal readiness to die by defenders of the regime.

In the interview, the president laid the blame for Hama squarely at the door of the United States. Making his clearest accusations yet, he said: "I have no doubt that this was an American intelligence operation. I have proof of U.S. involvement. It is three sorts.

'Some of the criminals have confessed their contacts with U.S. agents. Secondly, at Hama we confiscated advanced communications equipment, and other equipment of American origin, which could only have reached the criminals with U.S. approval and through the channel of U.S. agents.

'Thirdly, it was the State Department--in obvious collusion with Muslim brotherhood groups abroad--which first broke the news of the Hama fighting.'

(Although the insurrection started on 2 February, news of it reached the outside world on 10 February when, simultaneously a State Department official in Washington and a spokesman for the Muslim brotherhood in Bonn revealed it.)

With heavy irony, the president speculated: 'Perhaps the United States does not consider that its terrorist acts in Syria come under the heading of international terrorism, which it seems keen to combat in other parts of the world.'

For his part, he promised tough treatment for those he sees as agents of the United States. "American lackeys have to be crushed."

Al-Asad believes the United States wants him overthrown because of his opposition to Camp David and to open the way for a peace settlement leaving Israel in possession of occupied Arab territory. "The United States and its agents in the area thought they could make Syria kneel to Israel's will."

Syrian relations with America have generally been edged with mistrust. The nearest the two countries got to friendship was in May 1977 when President Jimmy Carter met al-Asad in Geneva--a meeting which left al-Asad with the 'good and positive' impression that America would take Syrian interests into consideration and help bring about an 'honourable' peace.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Deterioration

Then disillusion set in. 'What has happened since has made us increasingly certain that the United States has no policy in this area; rather there is only an Israeli policy which the United States is carrying out.'

While it is true that al-Asad continues to make himself available to American visitors--he saw Philip Habib, President Reagan's special envoy in Damascus last week--there is no doubt that Hama has resulted in a further sharp deterioration of relations with the United States.

The farther al-Asad moves from Washington, the closer he gets to Moscow. 'Our relations with the Soviet Union, already good and friendly, are strengthening steadily,' he said.

The Soviet presence in Syria is apparent but, it seems, not resented--although about a dozen Soviet technicians have been murdered by al-Asad's Muslim opponents. The Soviet Embassy is the biggest embassy by far, and the ambassador, a long-serving diplomat, has the greatest access to the president of any foreign envoy.

Western diplomats estimated there are about 2,500 Soviet military advisers in Syria, under the command of a lieutenant-general and concentrated in air defence and electronic warfare. The Russians are supplying Syria with as many tanks as it can absorb, and it is generally agreed that its armed forces are stronger today than at the time of the 1973 war.

Soviet-Syrian closeness found expression in a treaty of friendship signed in October 1980. Al-Asad agreed to the treaty, after a decade of hesitation, in reluctant recognition that, faced with an American-backed Israel, he needed a big brother.

But al-Asad remains his own man, and there is no evidence the Russians dictate his regional moves. He did not consult them when, in a cool show of nerve, he moved ground-to-air missiles into Lebanon's Beqaa Valley last spring, restricting Israel's freedom in Lebanese skies. Menachem Begin has vowed to destroy the missiles, but they are still there.

'We are where we are,' the president said. 'We are present on Arab soil, in a fraternal Arab country. Neither Israel nor anyone else has a right to intervene. But if we are attacked, we will fight back.'

On the wider Arab-Israeli issue, al-Asad sees no future for a negotiated settlement so long as Begin remains in office. 'Since Begin refuses to give any territory back, on what can we negotiate?'

Al-Asad seems to put his faith in an Egypt restored to anti-Israel belligerence and a revival of a two-front strategy. 'Egypt is part of the Arab nation. It will return to the Arab fold--without strings. Its cause is the cause of the Arabs, its stand is the stand of the Arabs.'



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

He added: 'I have known President Mubarak very well for a long time'--both are former air force commanders and both trained in Russia--'but there has been no contact between us since he took over the presidency.' (Some other Arab countries have made furtive contacts with Egypt, still officially beyond the pale.)

Three constants determine Syria's relations with its neighbours.

One is that Syria feels it alone stands in the way of an Israeli walk-over, that it is the only active champion of Arab rights, the guarantee that Arab dignity will one day be vindicated. Many an Arab would echo the president's assertion: 'I have no doubt, even for a minute, that we will regain our rights, no matter how long it takes.'

A second constant is the conviction that Lebanon, Jordan, and what is left of Arab Palestine, belong historically to Syria and fall within its natural sphere of influence.

The third is that Syria is the geopolitical heart of the region, that nothing can be done without it, that it is the maker of peace and war.

Al-Asad has been notably stubborn in affirming Syria's importance. The visitor leaves his presence convinced that no diplomatic initiative which omits Syria from the equation can succeed.

COPYRIGHT: The Observer Ltd 1982

CSO: 4400/156

END